A prospective risk assessment of informal carers’ medication administration errors within the domiciliary setting by Parand, Anam et al.
  
Anam Parand, Giuliana Faiella, Bryony Dean Franklin, 
Maximilian Johnston, Fabrizio Clemente, Neville A. Stanton 
and Nick Sevdalis 
A prospective risk assessment of informal 
carers’ medication administration errors 
within the domiciliary setting 
 
Article (Accepted version) 
(Refereed) 
Original citation: 
Parand, Anam, Faiella, Giuliana, Franklin, Bryony Dean, Johnston, Maximillian, Clemente, 
Fabrizo, Stanton, Neville A and Sevdalis. Nick (2017) A prospective risk assessment of informal 
carers’ medication administration errors within the domiciliary setting. Ergonomics Journal, pp 1-
18, ISSN 1366-5847 
 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/0.1080/00140139.2017.1330491  
 
© 2017 Taylor & Francis  
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/73772/ 
 
Available in LSE Research Online: August 2017 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. You may freely distribute the URL 
(http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE Research Online website.  
 
 
 
  1 
A Prospective Risk Assessment of Informal Carers’  
Medication Administration Errors within the Domiciliary Setting 
 
Parand, Anam
1,2
, Faiella, Giuliana
3
, Franklin, Bryony Dean
4
, Johnston, Maximilian
2
, 
Clemente, Fabrizio
3
, Stanton, Neville A
5
, Sevdalis, Nick
6
 
 
1 
Department of Social Psychology, London School of Economics, London, UK 
2
 The National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) Imperial Patient Safety Translational 
Research Centre, Imperial College London, London, UK  
3 
Institute of Bio-structure and Bio-imaging; National Centre of Research, University of 
Naples, Rome, ITALY 
4
Centre for Medication Safety and Service Quality, Pharmacy Department, Imperial College 
Healthcare NHS Trust / UCL School of Pharmacy, London, UK  
5
Engineering and the Environment, University of Southampton, Southampton, UK 
6
Centre for Implementation Science, Kings College London, London, UK
 
 
Correspondence to: Dr Anam Parand, Department of Social Psychology, London School of 
Economics, 318 Queens House, Holborn, London WC2A 3LG, UK. Email: 
a.parand@lse.ac.uk; Telephone: +44 (0) 207 955 7721. 
 
Manuscript Word Count: 3,877 words (excluding title page, acknowledgements, abstract 
and references). 
 
Acknowledgements and Funding: We would like to acknowledge and thank all of our team 
members, particularly: Ms Navila Chaudhry, Ms Fran Husson, Ms Judith Demello, Dr Prem 
Chana, Dr Susy Long, Mr Mahmood Ali, Ms Hedwiga Lehman, and Ms Margaret Turley. 
This paper represents independent research supported by the National Institute for Health 
Research (NIHR) Imperial Patient Safety Translational Research Centre. The views 
expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the NHS, the NIHR or the 
Department of Health. Sevdalis’ research was supported by the National Institute for Health 
  2 
Research (NIHR) Collaboration for Leadership in Applied Health Research and Care South 
London at King's College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust. Sevdalis is a member of King’s 
Improvement Science, which is part of the NIHR CLAHRC South London and comprises a 
specialist team of improvement scientists and senior researchers based at King’s College 
London. Its work is funded by King’s Health Partners (Guy’s and St Thomas’ NHS 
Foundation Trust, King’s College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust, King’s College London 
and South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust), Guy’s and St Thomas’ Charity, the 
Maudsley Charity and the Health Foundation.  
 
Competing Interests: Sevdalis is the director of London Safety and Training Solution Ltd, 
which provides patient safety advisory and training services on a consultancy basis to 
hospitals in the UK and internationally. The other authors have no competing interests to 
declare.  
  
  3 
A Prospective Risk Assessment of Informal Carers’ 
Medication Administration Errors within the Domiciliary Setting 
 
ABSTRACT  
Increasingly, medication is being administered at home by family and friends of the care-
recipient. This study aims to identify and analyse risks associated with potential drug 
administration errors made by informal carers at home. We mapped medication 
administration at home with a multidisciplinary team that included carers, healthcare 
professionals and patients. Evidence-based risk-analysis methodologies were applied: 
Healthcare Failure Modes and Effect Analysis (HFMEA), Systematic Human Error 
Reduction and Prediction Analysis (SHERPA) and Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and 
Processes (STAMP). The process of administration comprises seven sub-processes. Thirty four 
possible failure modes were identified and six of these were rated as high risk. These highlighted 
that medications may be given with a wrong dose, stored incorrectly, not discontinued as 
instructed, not recorded, or not ordered on time, and often caused by communication and 
support problems. Combined risk analyses contributed unique information helpful to better 
understand the medication administration risks and causes within homecare.  
 
Key Words: Patient safety; Medication Errors; HFMEA, SHERPA, Risk Assessment. 
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Practitioner Summary 
Increasingly, medication is being administered at home by family and friends of the care-
recipient. This study identifies risks associated with potential drug administration errors made 
by informal carers at home through consensus-based quantitative techniques. The different 
analyses contribute unique information helpful to better understand the administration risks 
and causes. 
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Introduction 
 
Home medication administration errors 
The home environment is unique and not designed for health care (Lang et al. 2008, McGraw 
et al. 2008). However, due to over-stretched hospitals, an ageing population and patient 
preference, more and more patients are requiring care within their own homes. Unfortunately, 
there is limited research on safety of such patients in the home compared to the hospital 
setting (Madigan 2007, Lang et al. 2008, Masotti et al. 2010). Recent research has identified a 
considerable number of adverse events that occur at home (e.g. 13.2 per 100 home care cases) 
(Sears et al. 2013), and a potential for higher adverse events than in hospitals (Woodward et 
al. 2002, Masotti et al. 2009). Drug-related adverse events have been reported to be the most 
common adverse events in the home (Masotti et al. 2010), largely comprising problems 
associated with polypharmacy (Riker and Setter 2012) and medication administration errors 
(MAEs). 
Aside from patients’ own adherence to medication, on which there is a wealth of literature 
(McDonald et al. 2002, Sokol et al. 2005), those responsible for MAEs may include informal 
carers who are regularly involved in home medication management. These carers are 
typically relatives or friends of patients cared for in the home, who help with daily care 
activities and whose mistakes during administration of medication can result in severe and 
significant harmful outcomes for the patients (Kaushal et al. 2007, Zandieh et al. 2008).  
A recent systematic review of the literature on MAEs caused by carers in patients’ own 
homes has identified errors by informal carers to include wrong dosing of medication, wrong 
medication, missed administration, wrong time and wrong route of administration (Parand et 
al. 2016). Contributing factors to these MAEs included individual carer factors such as 
carer’s age, environmental factors such as storage, medication factors including 
polypharmacy, prescription communication factors and understanding instructions, 
psychosocial factors including carer-to-carer communication, and the care-recipient’s age. 
This evidence is almost exclusively retrospective in nature – prospective, structured risk 
analyses of informal carers’ medication administration practices are currently lacking. These 
would add to the literature by providing structured, quantitative and evidence-based 
overviews of the processes and carer-related actions involved in home medication 
administration, where the risks may occur, and suggestions for how they may be prevented. 
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Structured risk analyses as used in numerous high-risk industries, have the advantage of 
systematic risk representation and evaluation – in comparison to the subjectivity of self-
report. Further, prospective approaches have an advantage over other retrospective 
investigative approaches such as root cause analysis that suffer from ‘hindsight bias’ (the 
tendency to exaggerate the extent to which they would have predicted the predictability of 
event), ‘outcome bias’ (the tendency to use outcome knowledge in evaluations of decision 
quality) and ‘assimilation to the familiar’ (not searching beyond the most recognised 
contributory factors) (Henriksen and Kaplan 2003). 
 
Aim 
The aim of this study was to apply a combination of evidence-based, structured, quantitative 
risk analysis methods to identify and analyse the risks associated with informal carers’ MAEs 
in the home of adult patients and their effects on patient care and safety.   
 
Methods 
Prospective Risk Analyses 
We applied three evidence-based and well-established risk analyses techniques to MAEs 
within homecare: Healthcare Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (HFMEA
TM
) is a prospective 
risk assessment tool that maps out a process of care and identifies potential hazards, their 
severity, probability and detectability, and their causes and solutions (DeRosier et al. 2002). 
It was designed by the United States Department of Veterans Affairs’ National Center for 
Patient Safety (DeRosier et al. 2002), developed from the FMEA NASA (National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration) tool (National Aeronautic and Space Administration 
1966) that was originally implemented within industry (military, automotive and aviation). 
More recently, HFMEA has been used to inform patient safety, including medication 
administration failures (Habraken et al. 2009, Yue et al. 2012). Specifically, the HFMEA 
approach highlights failure modes (different ways that a process or sub-process can fail to 
provide the anticipated result) (DeRosier et al. 2002) and the effects that these failures may 
have.  
HFMEA has been criticised for its subjectivity and time consuming nature (Franklin et al. 
2012, Chadwick and Fallon 2013). A recent validity study that showed HFMEA to raise 
important hazards also recommended multiple hazard analysis methods to achieve a more 
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comprehensive assessment (Potts et al. 2014). In consideration of these critiques, we wanted 
to address some of the criticisms by clearly defining rating scale anchors, and by 
incorporating additional assessment tools to supplement the HFMEA approach. We therefore 
also used Systematic Human Error Reduction and Prediction Analysis (SHERPA), as a 
human error prediction technique (Embrey 1986), and Systems-Theoretic Accident Model 
and Processes (STAMP), an accident causation model that focuses on failure of control 
measures (Leveson 2004). These tools have separately shown promise in identifying problem 
areas in healthcare (Lyons et al. 2004) and combining SHERPA with HFMEA has been 
previously suggested (Chadwick and Fallon 2013). Additionally, SHERPA in particular and 
human factor identification in general have been recommended for examining medication 
errors and MAE (DeRosier et al. 2002) and SHERPA has been previously validated as a 
reliable tool (Harris et al. 2005, Stanton et al. 2009).  
 
Design 
Figure 1 illustrates the main steps of the integrated methodologies. As referenced in the 
figure, we followed DeRosier et al’s five steps for HFMEA (DeRosier et al. 2002): (1) Define 
the HFMEA topic; (2) Assemble the team; (3) Graphically describe the process; (4) Conduct 
a hazard analysis; and (5) Identify actions and outcome measures to test the new process. 
Simultaneously to steps three, four and five, we introduced SHERPA to better understand the 
sequence of events and to categorise human errors involved in the process, and the STAMP 
framework to identify control errors and communication flows. The SHERPA and STAMP 
analysis was performed by two of the authors (GF & AP) and fed back to the team, in 
accordance with methodological guidelines (Stanton et al. 2014).  
 
[Figure 1 near here] 
 
 
Team composition  
A purposive and snowball sampling strategy was used to identify 14 key stakeholders (12 
from England and two from Italy) involved in or knowledgeable about medication 
administration to adults at home and/or the use of HFMEA (Appendix 1). These comprised 
pharmacists (BDF, JD, NC, MA), psychologists (AP, NS), patients (FH, MT), an elderly care 
consultant physician (SL), a community nurse (HD) and a family member carer (MT). In 
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addition to a team leader (AP), there were three facilitators (PC, MJ, GF) with prior expertise 
in HFMEA. The team included members who were not familiar with the specific study topic 
(PC, MJ).   
 
 
Procedure 
Four two-hour team meetings took place between 5 August and 2 September 2014, with 
additional email correspondence before and after each meeting. Each meeting had 10 team 
members in attendance for the entire duration of the meeting with a pre-specified mix of 
representatives with different backgrounds and expertise (e.g. there were at least two informal 
carers and two pharmacists at each meeting). Prior to the first meeting, the team members 
were emailed a research information sheet, an accompanying consent form and a PowerPoint 
presentation explaining the HFMEA stages and meeting arrangements. The four meetings 
covered the following content: (1) Introduction and graphical representation of process; (2) 
Failure mode identification and hazard analysis; (3): Cause analysis; and (4) Actions and 
outcome measures. 
 
At the first meeting, the team defined the scope of the project more precisely, particularly 
concerning who the target care-recipient might be and the type of medication to focus on. The 
process starting point was agreed to be the moment the carer receives the medication 
prescription from a healthcare professional. A further assumption was that the prescription 
and any accompanying healthcare professionals’ instructions were without error, so that the 
focus remained on possible errors involving the informal carer. The team expanded the 
original definition of an MAE (‘any deviation between the medication as prescribed and that 
administered’ (Barber et al. 2009)) to include deviations from best practice guidelines, so that 
we could more comprehensively examine failures around the medication administration 
process. 
 
We asked the team to focus on two exemplar situations, representing a low risk medication 
(tablets) and a high risk medication (insulin injection), with accompanying scenarios (box 1).  
 
[Box 1 near here] 
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Based on a systematic review of the literature on carers’ MAEs (Parand et al. 2016), and 
publicly available guides for medication administration (The Regulation and Quality 
Improvement Authority 2012, Royal Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain 2014), we 
identified a list of sub-processes for the process of medication administration, verified by a 
pharmacist (NC) prior to its presentation to the wider team (see Figure 2). In accordance with 
DeRosier’s step 3, we then graphically presented the sub-processes to the team who were 
invited to suggest amendments. 
 
Once consensus was agreed, the tasks and their failure modes for each sub-process were 
identified by the team. The team leader asked general questions to help the group discussion, 
such as “what could go wrong here?” The team then rated the severity and probability of each 
failure mode on a rating scale of minor, moderate, major, or catastrophic for severity, and 
remote, uncommon, occasional, or frequent for probability. Hazard scores were calculated by 
multiplying the severity and probability (Tables 1a &b). These rating scales and hazard 
scores were based on HFMEA and SHERPA guidelines (DeRosier et al. 2002, Stanton et al. 
2004) and were defined clearly for the team. Team members first provided individual scores 
by email and then collectively discussed their scores in the meetings. 
[Tables 1a & 1b near here] 
 
For failure modes that received a hazard score of 8 or above (referred to as critical failure 
modes) (DeRosier et al. 2002), a decision tree was used to determine controls (measures for 
prevention), detectability and criticality (importance of activity/task) (DeRosier et al. 2002). 
Two members of the team (GF & AP) identified any point whereby if the activity fails, the 
entire process would fail, referred to as a ‘Single Point of Weakness’ (SPW) and confirmed 
these with the team. The analysis of SPW overlaps with SHERPA’s criticality analysis that 
also aims to identify the failures that have critical consequences. 
 
 
Next, the team brainstormed possible causes of each of these critical failure modes, 
regardless of whether they had effective control measures or not. The team made 
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recommendations on the critical failure modes and considered relevant outcomes measures 
that could be used to assess success of proposed solutions. 
Separately, two members of the team (GF & AP) followed SHERPA guidelines (Embrey 
1986, Stanton et al. 2004) to identify the hierarchy and sequence of tasks (‘hierarchical task 
analysis’) (Stanton 2006) human errors (‘human error identification’), consequences of 
failure modes (‘consequence analysis’), any points where the activity can recover from the 
failure (‘recovery analysis’), and proposed error reduction solutions (‘remedy analysis’, 
divided into equipment, training, procedures and organisational solutions). The consequence 
analysis was also used to identify any discrepancies between the SHERPA and HFMEA 
severity ratings made by the team where the consequence was the same. For example, we 
found the team had collectively rated the consequence for wrong dose as both a high and low 
severity consequence, and this was later resolved by the team). The STAMP method 
additionally provided a tool to examine the controls and communication problems via closer 
examination of communication networks and measures already in place and to classify causes 
identified by HFMEA, using an adapted taxonomy. Classifications from STAMP were 
adapted to the study subject (e.g. the control measures/constraints of the process were defined 
as supporting material, double checks, utensils, and training.). Double-blind inter-rater 
reliabilities between two of the authors (GF & AP) were performed using Cohen’s Kappa test 
(Cohen 1968) on the SHERPA hierarchical task analysis and human error identification and 
remedy analysis classifications and the STAMP causal classifications. 
At the end of the process, all data were presented back to the team to verify the findings and 
an evaluation form was completed by team members. This form included open questions 
about the advantages and disadvantages of the HFMEA process, suggestions for 
dissemination, and ratings of importance and difficulty of the different stages involved 
(Appendix 5). The questions focused on HFMEA. The team members and facilitators were 
asked extra questions by the team leader about the material and challenges/enablers of 
facilitating.  
 
Ethical approval was obtained from the Camden and Islington NHS National Research Ethics 
Service Committee, reference 13/L0/1319. 
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Results 
Processes, failure modes and error types 
Figure 2 presents the complete process of medication administration for both high and low 
risk scenarios. This comprised seven sub-processes: (1) understanding the prescription; (2) 
storing the medication; (3) pre-monitoring the patient; (4) preparing the medication; (5) 
giving the medication; (6) (re)storing/discarding the medication; and (7) post-monitoring the 
patient. There were 23 tasks/activities, one of which (preparing the patient) was not 
applicable for the low-risk medication and two were not relevant for the high-risk medication 
(ensuring the medication has been taken/given
1
, and putting the medication back in its 
packaging). Thirty-four failure modes were identified in total, six of which were rated as 
critical according to the hazard scores, three per medication type (Appendix 2). The critical 
failure modes for insulin injections were: (4.7i) ‘The medication is measured out incorrectly’, 
(5.1d) ‘the medication is given with a wrong dose’, and (5.3h) ‘the given/not given 
medication is not recorded’. For tablets, these were: (2.2c) ‘the medication is stored out of the 
original container that is dispensed and labelled by the pharmacist’, (7.3c) ‘not discontinuing 
medication as instructed after starting the next medication’, and (7.4g) ‘the medication in 
short supply are not ordered’.  
Four of these six failure modes represent deviations from prescriptions, and two deviations 
from best practice: (5.3h) ‘the given/not given medication is not recorded’ and (2.2c) ‘the 
medication is stored out of the original container’.  
The sub-processes with the highest number of possible failures were: (4) preparing the 
medication, (5) giving the medication, and (7) storing or discarding the medication. However, 
the sub-processes with the highest number of critical failure modes were giving the 
medication and storing/discarding the medication. This highlights that acts relating to giving 
and storing/discarding the medicines are perceived to be most vulnerable. This further varies 
by type of medication, with failure modes associated with giving the medication more critical 
for insulin injections and failure modes associated with storing/discarding medication more 
problematic for tablet medication. As expected, the scores pertaining to administration of 
insulin injections had higher severity ratings than those for tablets. 
                                                          
1
 This was not relevant because insulin injection devices used by patients and carers do not allow for incomplete 
administration, and would be administered directly by the carer in this case 
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Although all of the critical failure modes were either rarely or not at all detectable (Tables 2 
& 3), there were 31 recovery points and only two had single points of weakness: the 
medication is not prepared and the medication is not given (Appendix 2). 
 
The human error identification (SHERPA) revealed that the human errors were mostly 
retrieval errors (specifically, incomplete information retrieval) at the very start of the process 
when receiving information about the prescription, and then mostly omission of operation 
and checking issues, such as not discarding expired medication or omission of checks of 
medication expiry dates. Also noted was one selection error (selecting medication) and one 
communication error (notifying health care professionals of any side-effects). The 
categorised error types are presented by task in Figure 2 and by failure mode in Appendix 2.  
The hierarchical task analysis (SHERPA) presents additional information related to the 
pathway, specifically the order in which tasks are carried out, either in sequence or at the 
same time, and whether a task is dependent upon another task (Figure 2). For example, if the 
carer recognises side effects, they can only then conduct the task of informing healthcare 
professionals accordingly.  However, checking the remaining amount of medication and 
discarding old/expired medication can be conducted at the same time.  
 
 
Causes and recommendations for critical failure modes  
STAMP causal analysis (see Appendix 3 for full results) identified that the most common 
causes (classified by the HFMEA analysis) were due to inadequate reading, listening or 
understanding of information provided by control measures (e.g. carers with poor literacy) or 
inadequate operation by carer (e.g. medication taken out of the original container to keep 
medications together), followed by inappropriate or ineffective control measures in place to 
prevent failures. These demonstrate that issues are most likely due to carers’ understanding of 
medication advice, down to their chosen behaviours, and that there is a need for control 
measures to address such issues. The examination of communication networks 
additionally revealed problems in the branch of the actuator’s (person in control of the 
system) loop, further highlighting the importance of healthcare professionals’ instructions 
and training on specific topics such as medication identification and storage.  
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Tables 2 and 3 illustrate the causes, current and proposed solutions by the team, those 
responsible for their implementation, detectability and outcome measures per critical failure 
mode. These are summarised in Appendix 4 for both the low and high-risk medications. 
 
 
Methodological evaluation 
The survey evaluation by the 14 team members had a response rate of 100%. It showed that 
the majority perceived the main aspects of the HFMEA process to be both important and 
difficult. For example, the majority of respondents found the graphical presentation and 
identification of failure modes and their causes and solutions to be important (at least 10 of 
14 respondents rated each of these to be of high importance on a 1-5 low to high importance 
scale), with more variance in their agreement on the difficulty of these tasks.  The converse 
was true for scoring the risks; there was more disagreement between team members on the 
importance of the task of rating (only half of the group rated it as important) and most agreed 
it to be a difficult process (10/14 rated it as highly difficult). More positively, everyone 
considered the scenarios to be very useful and almost all responded that the two-hour 
duration of the meetings were reasonable and felt that the solutions/findings from this study 
will help inform carers about home MAE. In addition, there were good Cohen’s Kappa inter-
rater reliability scores for SHERPA hierarchical task analysis classifications (κ=0.875, 
p<0.001), SHERPA human error identification classifications (κ=0.707, p<0.001), SHERPA 
solutions (κ=0.838, p<0.001), and STAMP causes (κ=0.721, p<0.001). 
 
[Figure 2 near here] 
[Table 2 near here] 
[Table 3 near here] 
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DISCUSSION  
This study has revealed potential vulnerabilities in the process of carers administering 
medication for their adult family or friends at home. The different prospective risk analyses 
additionally highlight distinct and corresponding areas for improvement, and the results 
demonstrate variations by medication type for what may go wrong and the likelihood and 
impact. The majority of risks were perceived to lie in the process of preparing, giving and 
storing/discarding the medication, with the latter two tasks most susceptible to significant 
error for insulin injections and tablet medication respectively.  
The most common causes of errors revealed communication/comprehension and support 
problems.  Most likely confounding this was an identified reluctance to ask for help. While 
there has been a recent focus on patient and carer involvement on speaking up for medication 
safety within the hospital setting, little exists on this in the home (Garfield and Parand 2015). 
There is however evidence that home carers’ poor knowledge and understanding of 
medication administration can be problematic (Parand et al. 2016). Parents who have some 
knowledge about medication dosing are more likely to dose appropriately (Li et al. 2000) and 
yet healthcare providers often fail to provide relevant medication information (Lemer et al. 
2009). These findings from the adult-child situation are likely to extrapolate to an adult-adult 
carer relationship. Other key causes from the present study included impractical medication 
package designs, and carers’ organisational and record-keeping skills.  
 
 
Implications and recommendations  
Recommendations to address the communication and support causes centred around 
educating pharmacists, GPs and community nurses on provision of guidance to carers on the 
identified key risks.  These include advice to carers about how to recognise medications from 
their appearance, to store and discard them appropriately, the methods and benefits of 
recording medication administration, to encourage the carers to speak about any difficulties 
in medication administration and demonstrating technical aspects of administration to them. 
These recommendations are aligned with findings that suggest that healthcare professionals 
should check with informal carers about the details of their medicine administration and 
imply reduced carer MAE following administration demonstration and guidance (Gribetz and 
Cronley 1987, Guberman 1990). Successful interventions have comprised of more detailed 
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initial instructions and provided equipment for medication administration (McMahon et al. 
1997) and weekly lessons on home safety (Llewellyn et al. 2003).  
On a wider scale, our findings support the need for system changes, such as checks at hospital 
discharge and alerts to carers to order new medications. These could in turn help carers to 
communicate, in a timely fashion, with clinicians to ensure medication is procured in good 
time. A systematic literature review of self and carer-administered medication errors similarly 
advocated improvement of verbal and written information provided to address 
communication and information problems (Mira et al. 2015). This review, like other studies 
before it, further raises the importance of design and technology solutions for MAEs. Our 
study particularly emphasise the importance of medication package design and IT 
communication systems. 
In addition to practical recommendations, this study provides wider implications. The fact 
that the critical failure modes were different for tablets and insulin injections shows the 
importance of a tailored analysis to different medicines and that different solutions should be 
considered for different types of medication.  The combined methodologies further hold 
implications for theory. Specifically, the individual analyses derive from contrasting 
assumptions, not least in how systems-focused or reductionist they are in their approach. 
Directions for future research would be to evaluate, with the use of objective measures, the 
added benefits of the combined analyses over and above any one singular analysis applied 
alone. A separate paper by the authors currently under review explores these theoretical 
advances from this present study and outlines how STAMP and SHERPA address criticisms 
of HFMEA (e.g. that HFMEA lacks analysis of human errors).  
Evidence of reliability and usefulness of the approach can further be sought from application 
to other medication scenarios and with different participants. A next step to build on the 
present study results could be to consult human factor engineering experts on the practicality 
of proposed solutions to improve medication packaging, equipment and storage (e.g. re-
designing dossette boxes), and how to use IT systems for monitoring and support amongst 
carers and healthcare professionals (e.g. with telemonitoring). A focus on how information is 
currently given could additionally help to tailor feedback. 
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The study recommendations are to be disseminated to community carer groups across UK 
cities and London Boroughs, including mental health and black minority ethnic groups via 
members of the HFMEA team.  
  
Strengths and limitations 
We have already outlined limitations of the HFMEA methodology according to the literature 
and how we have attempted to minimise biases. As found by others evaluating HFMEA, the 
process was found to be worthwhile in its aim but time consuming and subjective (Nagpal et 
al. 2010, Chadwick and Fallon 2013). Much of the value of the process was considered to be 
from mapping out the process, tasks and failure modes with relevant participants offering 
different perspectives. The prioritisation from hazard scores and recommendations from a 
small sample should be considered with caution and the recommendations were not evaluated 
for cost-benefit; the associated financial burden is something that needs to be considered by 
implementers. Similarly, suggestions based on best practice such as recording the 
administration of doses should be considered on an individual case basis, so as not to put 
further strain on the carers’ already difficult role. Specific to our study, a higher proportion of 
informal carers within the team might have enriched the findings further from their 
perspective, and inter-rater reliability was performed by only two members of the team. 
 
The strengths of this study include its prospective design, mixed-analysis, multi-disciplinary 
team and comparison by medication type, along with reliability testing of the methods 
(Stanton and Young 1999), comparable with previous findings (Stanton et al. 2009). This 
adds to the predominantly retrospective and unstructured nature of the existing evidence. It is 
the first time that systematic risk assessment has been applied to examine home carers’ 
medication administration and the first time that these three analytical methods have been 
combined. Together the mixed analysis should provide a more robust analysis of the risks 
associated with MAE and we found the three methods to be complementary. For example, 
hierarchical task analysis highlighted errors that may result from the incorrect order of tasks, 
and as found elsewhere in the hospital setting, human error identification facilitated 
consideration of how human interaction with tasks of medication administration can result in 
MAE (Lane et al. 2006).  
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Conclusion 
This prospective study has exposed a number of risks and effects associated with informal 
carers’ potential MAEs for both low and high-risk medications. The most common causes 
involved communication and support problems. In particular, carers may not be instructed 
about or understand the purpose of medications and administration technique and they may 
not be accustomed to record information or use tools to help manage medication. There was 
also a perceived lack of awareness by carers of the importance of the labels on the packaging 
as well as reluctance to ask for help or admit to problems. Recommendations centred around 
educating pharmacists, GPs and community nurses on the most hazardous risks of medication 
administration, and guidance for carers to help prevent or ameliorate these key risks. 
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Caption of Figures 
 
Figure 1. Flowchart of steps of integrated methodologies 
 
Figure 2. Process diagram & SHERPA task classification for home carer medication 
administration for tablets and insulin injection 
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Box 1. HFMEA Scenarios  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1a: HFMEA and SHERPA Hazard ratings (DeRosier et al. 2002, Stanton et al. 2004)  
Severity ratings Probability ratings 
HFMEA - Score SHERPA HFMEA - Score SHERPA 
Catastrophic  4 
High 
Frequent 4 High 
Major    3 
Medium 
Occasional 3 
Medium 
Moderate 2 Uncommon 2 
Minor 1 Low Remote 1 Low 
HFMEA=Human Failure Modes and Effect Analysis; SHERPA=Systematic Human Error Reduction and Prediction Analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  23 
 
 
Table 1b: HFMEA hazard scoring matrix with SHERPA ratings (Derosier et al. 2002, 
DeRosier et al. 2002, Stanton et al. 2004) 
  HFMEA=Human Failure Modes and Effect Analysis; SHERPA=Systematic Human Error Reduction and Prediction Analysis. 
  Red=high risk, yellow=medium risk, green=low risk. 
 
 
 HFMEA Severity of Effect 
HFMEA 
Probability 
 
Catastrophic  
[rating:4] 
[SHERPA rating = 
High (H)] 
Major  
[rating:3] 
[SHERPA rating = 
Medium (M)] 
Moderate  
[rating:2] 
[SHERPA rating = 
Medium (M)] 
Minor  
[rating:1] 
[SHERPA rating = 
Low (L)] 
Frequent  
[rating:4] 
[SHERPA rating = High (H)] 
(4x4=) 16 (4x3=) 12 (4x2=) 8 (4x1=) 4 
Occasional  
[rating:3] 
[SHERPA rating = Medium 
(M)] 
(3x4=) 12 (3x3=) 9 (3x2=) 6 (3x1=) 3 
Uncommon  
[rating:2] 
[SHERPA rating = Medium 
(M)] 
(2x4=) 8 (2x3=) 6 (2x2=) 4 (2x1=) 2 
Remote  
[rating:1] 
[SHERPA rating = Low (L)] 
(1x4=) 4 (1x3=) 3 (1x2=) 2 (1x1=) 1 
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Table 2. Low-risk scenario causes, solutions and outcome measures for critical failure modes 
 
The medication is stored out of the original container that 
is dispensed and labelled by the pharmacist [2.2.c]  
Not discontinuing medication as instructed, after starting the 
next medication [7.3.e] 
The medication in short supply are not ordered [7.4.g] 
Present 
solutions 
 Medication administration aids, e.g. multi-compartment 
compliance aids (MCCAs), such as Dossette boxes filled 
by the community pharmacist for one month 
 Information on medication strips 
Medication administration organisers. 
Emergency supply bag available in pharmacy 
 
Detectable? Rarely detectable by a second carer or healthcare professionals Rarely detectable by a second carer or healthcare professionals 
Rarely detectable by a second carer or healthcare 
professionals 
Causes 
(most common 
underlined) 
 
1. The medication is taken out of the original container in 
order to keep them all together 
2. The medication is stored out of the packaging because of 
impractical packaging. 
3. The medication is stored out of the packaging due to lack 
of storage space (e.g. the packaging is too big) 
4. The medication is preserved in a container that is well-
known by the patient to avoid refusal by the patient 
1. The carers do not understand the purpose of a medication or 
why the GP has changed/stopped it. 
2. The Dossette box remains full of the discontinued medication 
3. The carers do not know what to do with medications that are 
no longer needed 
4. The IT system does not support the coordination and 
communication among the carers and GPs/Pharmacists 
5. The carers are not informed about the new therapy because 
the GPs only speak to the patient 
6. The GP does not check the carers’ comprehension of therapy 
because of time constraints 
1. The carers have poor organisational skills (e.g. 
inability to prioritise activities or plan ahead) 
2. The carers are busy 
3. The carers over rely on emergency supply 
4. The carers are not aware that they can request an 
emergency supply from their pharmacy 
5. The carers forget/are forgetful 
 
 
 
Proposed 
Solutions 
The pharmacists or GPs guide the carers on how to 
store medications correctly (e.g. reminders about the 
importance of the labels on container/ blister pack) 
 
T 
The pharmacists provide written instructions to explain 
what to do with old medications 
T 
 
The carers note the date of when to order new 
prescriptions in a part of the house that others 
use frequently 
P 
 
The carers are instructed to recognise medications 
from their appearance (e.g. shape, colour) 
 
T 
The GPs or the pharmacists highlight the name of the 
current medication on the prescription 
P 
 
The carers communicate the date for ordering 
new prescriptions to the others outside of the 
home 
O 
 
IT solutions to be developed and used in order to help 
share information between GP, pharmacists and carers 
(e.g. Telemonitoring) 
O 
The carers are asked to make a plan to order 
medications (e.g. on a spreadsheets) 
T 
Carers periodically check prescriptions to avoid 
continuing old medication 
P 
The carer creates personal reminder systems 
(e.g. alarm, checklist, calendar, text message, 
chart)  
E 
The GPs use a form to notify the carer that their 
medication has changed 
E 
Pharmacy alerts carers when it is necessary to 
order new medications 
P 
Responsible 
 Carer(s) 
 GP(s) 
 Community Pharmacist(s) 
 Hospital Consultant(s) 
 Carer(s) 
 GP(s) 
 Community Pharmacist(s) 
 Carer(s) 
 GP(s) 
 Community Pharmacist(s) 
Outcome 
measures 
The pharmacists or GPs regularly check the medication 
storage with questions 
 The pharmacists regularly check the usage of the current 
medications with questions 
 The carers keep a written record with information about 
medications and the date that they have been dispensed 
Pharmacy alerts carers when it is necessary to order new 
medications  
SHERPA Remedy Analysis: Equipment (E) = redesign or modification of existing equipment; Training (T) = changes in training or informing carer/patient of procedures to follow; Procedures (P) = provision of 
new or redesign of old procedures; Organisational (O) = changes in organisational policies or culture. [Numbers in square brackets refer to failure modes in Appendix 2] 
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Table 3. High-risk scenario causes, solution and outcome measure for critical failure modes 
 
The medication is measured out wrongly (i.e. the 
dose is wrong) [4.7.i] 
The medication is given with a wrong dose [5.1.d] The given/not given medication is not recorded [5.3.h] 
Present solutions 
 Some insulin pens have a dial to set the 
individualised amount of insulin 
 Training and assessment of carers made by 
community healthcare professionals 
 The carers write down a list of patient's medications (e.g. 
My medication passport(Barber et al. 2014)) 
 Information about the doses provided by the community 
service (i.e. community nurses and clinics) 
None 
 
Detectable? 
Difficult to detect. Particularly for small medication 
measurement doses; it depends on the design of 
syringe or insulin pen  
No No 
Causes 
(most common 
underlined) 
 
1. The carers do not admit problems with their 
medication administration because they are 
worried about being labeled as ‘someone that 
cannot cope’ 
2. Frequent changes of insulin pens that have 
different dials, (e.g. unit, half unit, and different 
system to set the maximum) 
3. The carers are rushing due to stress or other 
reasons 
4. The carers have difficulties in reading the dial 
because of poor eyesight 
5. The carers haven’t been trained adequately 
1. The carers do not understand the instructions or 
specific requirements to adjust the dose. 
2. The carers do not read the instructions 
3. The carers misunderstand the prescriptions 
4. The carers have difficulties in using syringes or 
insulin pens 
5. The carers have not been trained adequately in 
measuring out the doses 
6. The carers have difficulties in acquiring 
information about the dose from the GP 
7. Failure mode 5.7 (The medication is measured out 
wrongly) 
1. The carers do not feel the necessity to record the given/not 
given medications because it is a part of their daily routine  
2. The carers have poor literacy and cannot read or write (e.g. 
language and cultural barriers) 
3. The carers have not been told to record medications 
4. The carers do not have the organisational or IT skills (e.g. 
they do not have the skills to create an Excel spread sheet) 
5. The carers assume that they will always be around (e.g. to 
tell healthcare professionals about medications given) 
6. The carers have to manage many medications that change 
frequently 
 
 
Proposed 
Solutions 
The GPs monitor and support the patients 
and carers in the measurement of the doses 
(e.g. emphasising the unit measures on 
insulin pens or offering psychological 
support) 
 
P 
The GPs or pharmacists reinforce the use of records 
of patient medications (e.g. My Medication 
Passport(Barber et al. 2014) for insulin that helps to 
check the type and the doses of medication actually 
given)  
 
T 
The carers use tools (e.g. Excel spreadsheet) to record 
medications 
P 
The GPs or pharmacists encourage the carers 
to speak about their difficulties in 
medication administration 
 
P 
The carers are trained to administer medications with 
courses organised by community clinics 
 
T 
The carers are trained to improve their organisational or 
IT skills (e.g. how to use Excel spreadsheet or Notes 
application) 
T 
The community nurses support the carers in 
technical medication administration  
 
O/P 
Checks at discharge that carers understand 
instructions 
P 
The pharmacists promote the use of Medication 
Administration Record chart 
T 
Responsible 
 Carer(s) 
 GP(s) 
 Community-District nurse(s)  
 Carer(s) 
 GP(s) 
 Community pharmacist(s) 
 Carer(s) 
 GP(s)  
 Community Pharmacist(s) 
Outcome Measures 
Community healthcare professionals organise dummy 
runs to check carers’ technique of measuring out 
medication doses 
 The carers monitor the effects of therapy (e.g. wrong 
dose could cause deterioration) 
 Number of hospital admissions for wrong dose errors at 
home 
Excel spreadsheet with all scheduled medications 
SHERPA Remedy Analysis: Equipment (E) = redesign or modification of existing equipment; Training (T) = changes in training provided, informing carer/patient of procedures to follow; Procedures (P) = 
provision of new or redesign of old procedures; Organisational (O) = changes in organisational policies or culture 
 
